This is addressed to my position that the physical and mental states of the brain are identical. This is a simplification and probably misapplies the word 'identical'. It would be more accurate to say that the whole of what makes up what we call a mental state is encoded by some of the characteristics of the physical state of our brain. However, because this relation of mental state to brain state crosses knowledge domain boundaries it can be difficult or impossible to compare.
I say 'some of the characteristics' here because I think that not all of the functions of the brain are relevant to mental processes. For example, it would be a stretch to consider the hormonal regulation functions of the pituitary from a mental point of view. Other functions, such as the motor cortex or sense of touch, more clearly cross the boundaries between physical and mental.
I use 'brain' here loosely; in actual fact it would be difficult to draw a hard dividing line between what is brain and what is body and whether, e.g., touch receptors and motor neurons are part of 'the brain' and yet are not contained within the skull, as is the common definition of the brain. This detail is not important to understanding the general idea at hand, but is in itself an interesting topic.
While I believe that the most illuminating analogy has to do with the details of the internal workings of the modern digital computer, but because it is such a rich system it can add confusion. Instead I'll use a simpler model, a chalkboard.
We shall imagine a chalkboard upon which is written in chalk the words "Ron Brachman.". There are a number of ways one might think of this state of affairs. In answer to the question "What is on the chalkboard" a number of valid answers may be given: chalk, lines, letters, words, a sentence, a name.
What is the relationship between these ways of thinking about what is on the board? One of the most literal, or physical, answers is 'chalk'. In this area of interest or knowledge domain one finds upon the board only variously placed patches of chalk dust. A discussion of the various constituents of the chalk might take place in this knowledge domain (or perhaps one level lower, depending on your particular ontology).
Upon the consideration of the placement of the patches of chalk one is no longer directly interested in the particles of chalk but instead in the spatial placement of the particles. Such an examination would leave the area of interest or knowledge domain of the chalk and move on to a new knowledge domain in which a discussion of lines and the vagaries of their occurrence is the topic of interest.
Once again, after consideration of the lines of chalk upon the board, one might eventually form a classification system, or ontology, within the relevant knowledge domain into which particular distinct configurations of lines would be grouped, and again the study of these groupings enters a new knowledge level, that of letters.
So goes the consideration of different knowledge domains, through words, sentence structure and meaning (a name, in this example). In each domain the concepts within it, while related, do not depend upon the particulars of the related levels. The concept of, e.g., a given letter is not dependent upon the particulars of the classification within the 'lines' knowledge domain' which considers the intersections, lengths, curves, bounded areas and etc. that define a particular letter. Any letter might also be represented by raised bumps arranged on a surface in a spatial configuration, or by tones in a temporal configuration.
So, how is it that chalk particle states give rise to word states?
In this example, the word-state is identical to the chalk-state. The whole of what makes up what we call a word-state is encoded by some of the characteristics of the physical state of the chalk. However, because this relation of chalk-state to word-state crosses knowledge domain boundaries it can be difficult or impossible to compare. This is why the choice of 'identical' in this context is questionable.
Also, saying that 'the whole' of the state is encoded may be misleading. This again is a problem of working across knowledge domain boundaries. There exists within the domain of word-state concepts that do not exist in the domain of chalk-state. But I did not say that the word-state knowledge domain is represented within the knowledge domain of chalk-state. It is that insofar as the word-state is embodied by the chalk, it is valid to say that the word-state is encoded by or identical to the chalk-state.
Conceivably, if one cared to do so, it should be possible to transpose all relevant word knowledge domain statements into chalk knowledge domain statements, provided that the statements were translated through all of the intervening domains. A discussion about grammar in such an environment would be considerably more interminable than usual and would still contain valid word knowledge domain statements, they would just be so hopelessly verbose, containing such minutia of whether a given chalk particle ought be considered as part of a line.
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